charged that China's measures breached its commitments to eliminate export duties under Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol, and violated Article XI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which prohibits all quantitative restrictions on exports. In defense, China invoked the general exceptions under GATT Article XX(b) and (g), which excuses measures necessary to protect public health or relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources.
3. China is the world's largest producer and exporter of rare earths, a key input for many high-tech and strategic products. Production of rare earths is highly polluting. For years, China mined and processed the minerals with little regard for environmental protection, resulting in massive pollution in the mining regions as well as rapid depletion of rare-earths resources. Today, China supplies 95% of the global demand, even though it has only 30% of the world's known reserves. Desiring to conserve natural resources and strengthen environmental protection, but not to hinder development of domestic downstream industries, the government resorted to export restrictions so as to reduce foreign consumption. This policy, however, is inconsistent with the WIO rulings in Raw Materials, which became effective in February 2012, requiring China to treat foreign and domestic users evenhandedly in the distribution of its raw materials. (It should be noted that WTO law generally allows a Member to restrict exports by customs duties; but since China agreed to eliminate export duties in its Accession Protocol, it has forgone this right.
3 )
4. The main issues in RareEarths are almost identical to those in Raw Materials. As in Raw Materials, the key question concerning export quotas was whether China's measures met the requirements of Article XX, an evidentiary matter mostly. The Panel answered the question in the negative, and the Panel's ruling was upheld by the Appellate Body on appeal. Also as in RawMaterials, the key question concerning export duties was whether China may invoke GATTArticle XX to defend a breach of its commitment under Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. Following the AB's ruling in RawMaterials, the majority of the Panel found that GATT Article XX is not applicable to Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol. But one Panelist disagreed and filed a dissenting opinion on the issue. The Panel ultimately concluded that, even assuming GATT Article XX was available to Paragraph 11.3, China did not demonstrate that its use of export duties met the requirements of Article XX.
5. On appeal, the central issue for Chinawas the applicability ofGATTArticle XX to Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol. This is a pure legal issue that had already been decided once by the Appellate Body in Raw Materials. Although in theory WIO dispute settlemet rulings are binding only on the parties to a particular dispute, in practice the Appellate Body has treated its decisions as defacto binding precedents. Absent What is also remarkable is how opinions on this issue had shifted within a relatively short period of time. When China invoked Article XX to defend its breach of Paragraph 11.3 in Raw Materials, the panel was unanimously opposed, and none of the third parties supported China's position. Barely two years later, the Rare Earths proceedings witnessed one Panelist and several third parties siding with China on the issue. At the appellate stage, four out of the eight third parties that expressed views on this issue (Argentina, Brazil, Columbia, and Russia) supported the position of China and of the dissenting Panelist, with a fifth (South Korea) advocating the need to examine the record of China's accession negotiations in order to answer the question properly.
5
Thus, the majority of the third parties that spoke on the issue favored a reconsideration of AB's prior ruling.
7. This major shift of opinion among the participating Members, however, is not surprising. As previously commented in the pages of this Journal, 6 the AB's ruling that GATT Article XX is not applicable to Paragraph 11.3 of China's Accession Protocol is highly problematic. Paragraph 11.3 prescribes China's obligation to eliminate export duties, which is a "GATT-plus" obligation since the GATT explicitly permits a Member to levy export duties. In the light of China's explicit commitment contained in Paragraph 11.3 to eliminate export duties and the lack of any textual reference to Article XX of the GATT 1994 in that provision, we see no basis to find that Article XX of the GATT 1994 is applicable to export duties found to be inconsistent with Paragraph 11.3.
The AB's narrow textualist interpretation is inconsistent with the customary rules of interpretation contained in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which require a treaty interpreter to take into account broad contexts of the treaty and in the light of its object and purpose when interpreting specific terms of the treaty. The AB's interpretation is also inconsistent with the "holistic" approach that it has advocated for the interpretation of W\TO provisions. Legally, the AB's ruling has created an irrational state of affairs in -WTO law: while the most important obligations of the WTO, such as the most-favored-nation (MFN) and national treatment obligations, are all subject to public policy exceptions, a specific commercial commitment of China is not. Normatively, the AB's ruling stands for the undesirable position that, short of an explicit textual reference, a trade-liberalization obligation will trump the values ofpublic health and environmental protection as a matter of -WTO law.
8. The AB's ruling in Raw Materials has since met with much criticism. 9 In Rare Earths, the dissenting Panelist authored a 20-paragraph separate opinion, analyzing comprehensively why Article XX and all other general exceptions of GATT should 8 See e.g., AB Report, EC-Chicken Cuts, WI/DS269, 286/AB/R (12 September 2005), para. 176 (stating that interpretation pursuant to the VCLT rules is "ultimately a holistic exercise"). 9 E.g., Marco Bronckers & Keith E. Maskus, China Raw Materials: A Controversial
Step Towards Evenhanded Exploitation of Natural Resources, 13 (2) be automatically available to China's obligation under Paragraph 11.3.10 The dissenting Panelist and the several third parties in this case all recognized the inherent relationship between Paragraph 11.3 and the GATT provisions and emphasized the fundamental importance of the policy exceptions to the WTO system. Hence, they were of the view that, unless China explicitly waived its right to invoke the GATT policy exceptions, such exceptions should be available to China's obligation on export duties. 9. Regrettably, instead of seizing the opportunity to reexamine its previous decision, the Appellate Body saw "no reason to revisit" the ruling since China did not directly challenge it. (AB Reports, para. 5.65) It then conveniently ignored all the opposing arguments of the third parties, and dispensed with the entire opinion of the dissenting Panelist in a single footnote." That said, the Appellate Body apparently felt the need to recalibrate its approach in Raw Materials, as it stated:
[E]xpress textual references, or the lack thereof, to a covered agreement (such as the GATT 1994), a provision thereof (such as ... Article XX ofthe GATT 1994), or "the WIO Agreement" in general, are not dispositive in and of themselves. (AB Reports, para. 5.61, emphasis original)
This statement seems a far cry from the conclusion reached in Raw Materials quoted above. Having made this statement, however, the Appellate Body went on to claim that its ruling in Raw Materials was made "on the basis of a holistic analysis of all elements" (AB Reports, para. 5.63), thus effectively reaffirming its previous decision.
III. Relationship between WTO Agreements and Accession Protocols
10. Much of the confusion over the applicability of the GATT general exceptions to China's accession commitments stems from the lack of a clear understanding on the systemic relationship between China's Accession Protocol and the WTO agreements. In WTO practice, an accession protocol effectively serves two functions. One is to enable the applicant to accede to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (the WTO Agreement or the Marrakesh Agreement), to which the GATT and other trade agreements (collectively the "Multilateral Trade 10 Panel Reports, China-Rare Earths, WT/DS431, 432, 433/R (26 March 2014), paras. 7.118-7.138. 11 AB Reports, fn. 504. The note, which is to paragraph 5.68 that dismisses China's argument on the "intrinsic relationship" between specific provisions of its Accession Protocol and WIO provisions, reads as follows: "For these reasons, we also see no basis for the opinion of the dissenting panelist in these disputes that 'the defences provided in the GATT 1994 are automatically available to justify any GATT-related obligations, including border tariff-related obligations -unless a contrary intention is expressed by the acceding Member and WIO Members'. Indeed, the Appellate Body rejected arguments by China to this effect in China -Raw Materials".
Agreements") are annexed. The other is to stipulate special terms that will apply to the relationship between the acceding country and other Members under the WTO Agreement. These special terms may elaborate, expand or modify the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. The accession protocol also declares that it is "an integral part of the WIO Agreement". It is unclear, however, how a special term of the accession protocol should be "integrated" into the WIO Agreement and what such integration may entail. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to define the precise nature of the accession protocol and its relationship with the other agreements within the 'Y(/O legal framework. Because the accession documents contain little explanation on these foundational issues, the burden falls upon the treaty interpreter. 11. Thus far, the WIO judiciary has not clarified these foundational issues. In the several disputes involving China's Accession Protocol, the Appellate Body never discussed the precise nature or status of the protocol within the WTO treaty framework. As a result, it has not been able to properly define the relationship between the protocol provisions and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which has led to problematic juris-12 prudence. In Rare Earths, China specifically requested the AB to clarify the systemic relationship between its Accession Protocol and the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In response, the Appellate Body conducted an "integrated assessment" on such relationship, and its conclusions are summarized below (AB Report, para. 5.57): In short, the Appellate Body was of the view that the relationship between China's Accession Protocol and the Multilateral Trade Agreements is not different from the relationship among the Multilateral Trade Agreements, since they are all "integral parts" of the WTO Agreement. 12. From this basic position, the Appellate Body dismissed all of China's arguments. China had contended that specific provisions of the accession protocol should be treated as integral parts of one of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, depending on the subject matter to which they "intrinsically relate". The AB rejected this argument on the grounds that China did not provide "a clear definition" of the "intrinsic relationship" test and that China's position "sits uncomfortably with our interpretation that rights and obligations cannot be automatically transposed from one part of the WTO legal framework to another". (AB Reports, para. 5.68) China also sought to differentiate its Accession Protocol from the Multilateral Trade Agreements, arguing that unlike the Multilateral Trade Agreements, its Accession Protocol is not a "self-contained agreement , since it does not include most of the important features that many of the Multilateral Trade Agreements possess, such as proper general exceptions, security exceptions, or a modification clause. The Appellate Body dismissed the term "selfcontained agreement" as not being "an apt descriptor" of any of the agreements contained in the integrated WTO framework. Within the single package of WTO rights and obligations, the Appellate Body opined, whether an instrument can be characterized as a self-contained agreement is of "limited relevance". (AB Reports, para. 570) 13. None of the above reasons offered by the Appellate Body is persuasive. The fact that an accession protocol is made an integral part of the WTO Agreement does not mean it must be integrated into the WTO legal framework in the same manner and on the same legal basis as the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Unlike the Multilateral Trade Agreements, which were concluded simultaneously to provide the substantive disciplines of the WTO, the accession protocol is by nature a legal instrument for the WTO to admit a new member. The purpose of the instrument is to integrate the acceding country into the WTO system so that it will abide by the substantive disciplines of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. In practice, this instrument has evolved into a substantive agreement that can prescribe additional rules applicable to the acceding country only. These country-specific rules may elaborate, expand or deviate from the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, and their scope and contents vary from country to country, depending on the outcome of particular accession negotiations. Regardless of its coverage, however, the accession protocol is not designed to provide a coherent new discipline. Instead, it is structured to address subjects across the entire spectrum of the WTO legal framework, all in the context of the particular conditions of the acceding country. In other words, the accession protocol provides special terms on the application of the Multilateral Trade Agreements to the acceding country. As such, the provisions of the protocol cannot be understood independently from the general disciplines of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Given the particular nature, purpose and design of the accession protocol, its integration into the WTO Agreement can only be effectively achieved through the interaction between its specific provisions and the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements that address the same subject matter.
14. Notably, China also submitted that its Accession Protocol is properly characterized as a "subsequent agreement" relating to the same subject matter in the sense of Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Accordingly, China contended, to the extent that specific provisions of its Accession Protocol conflict with the provisions of the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the protocol provisions will prevail to the extent of the conflict. Pointing to Paragraph 11.3 of its Accession Protocol and GATTArticle XI: 1, China explained that, pursuant to VCLTArticle 30(3), GATT Article XI: 1 has been modified by Paragraph 11.3, so that China can no longer freely impose export duties under Article XI: 1. The Appellate Body again dismissed China's argument as not "comporting well" with its previously stated views. (1) Subject to Article 103 of the Charterof the UnitedNations, the rights and obligations of States Parties to successive treaties relating to the same subject matter shall be determined in accordance with the following paragraphs. (2) When a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail. (3) When all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation under article 59, the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty. (4) When the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one:
(a) as between States Parties to both treaties the same rule applies as in paragraph 3; (b) as between a State party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations.
to Article 30(3), when all the parties to the earlier treaty are parties also to the later treaty but the earlier treaty is not terminated or suspended in operation, "the earlier treaty applies only to the extent that its provisions are compatible with those of the later treaty". This provision embodies the doctrine of lex posterior. It recognizes that the parties to a treaty may enter into a subsequent treaty that effectively modifies the earlier treaty. Article 30 covers not only the situation where the parties to the two treaties are identical, but also the situation where there are additional parties to the later treaty. Pursuant to Article 30(4)(b), when the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one, "as between the States parties to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties governs their mutual rights and obligations". This provision is understood to cover both the situation where the additional party is only to the earlier treaty and the situation where the additional party is only to the later treaty. (4) 19. The above example shows that VCLT Article 30(3) not only is "apposite", but also is indispensable, for understanding the relationship between specific provisions of the accession protocol and those ofthe Multilateral Trade Agreements. In dismissing VCLTArticle 30(3) as inapposite, the Appellate Body apparently overlooked the need to resolve inconsistencies between the provisions of the accession protocol and those of the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Without first identifying and resolving such inconsistencies, however, it is impossible to interpret the accession protocol and other components of the WTO Agreement as the "single package of rights and obligations" in a coherent manner. 20. In sum, when assessing the relationship between China's Accession Protocol and the Multilateral Trade Agreements, the Appellate Body focused only on their commonality of being "integral parts" of the WTO Agreement, but ignored the specific nature, purpose and design that make the protocol distinct from the Multilateral Trade Agreements. Having ignored the distinct characteristics of China's Accession Protocol, the Appellate Body was not to recognize that the protocol interacts with the Multilateral Trade Agreements in a very different manner from the interaction among the Multilateral Trade Agreements and that VCLTArticle 30 contains the key to understanding the 17 As the dissenting Panelist in Rare Earths duly pointed out, the provisions of the GATT policy exceptions "strike a balance between the policy space governments enjoy to pursue legitimate objectives and their obligations under the GATT 1994". And "the fundamental importance of the flexibilities" provided in GATTArticle XX is "incontrovertible", in light of the purpose and objective of the WIO embodied in the preamble of the WIO Agreement. Panel Reports, Rare Earths, para. 7.137.
systemic relationship between the accession protocol and the \WTO agreements. Consequently, the Appellate Body was unable to clarify such relationship or provide any meaningful guidance on how to analyze it, except to say that such relationship must be determined on "a case-by-case" basis.
IV. Legitimacy of WTO Judicial Authority: Need for Self-Correction that its ruling was based on "a holistic analysis of all elements", a claim that cannot be backed up by its report. 25. The unwillingness of the Appellate Body to admit that it may have made a mistake or has changed its mind on a given issue is baffling. As the defacto top judicial organ of the WIO, 1 9 the Appellate Body has the power and authority not only to set a precedent, but also to change a precedent as it sees fit. Apparently, when stating that "absent cogent reason, an adjudicatory body will resolve the same legal question in the same way in a subsequent case"2O _a statement made in the context of admonishing a panel for not following AB's prior ruling on the same issue -the AB contemplated at least the possibility that it may one day depart from its previous decisions. Although what constitutes a "cogent reason" in the eye of the AB remains to be seen, one would think the need to correct mistakes should count as one such reason.
26. The justification for treating the AB decisions as defacto binding precedents is the desirability of "consistency and stability" in the interpretation of \WTO provisions, which the AB deemed as "essential" for promoting "security and predictability" in the WIO dispute settlement, as contemplated by Article 3.2 of the Dispute Settlement Understanding.
2 1 Indeed, consistency of jurisprudence is valued in both municipal and international legal systems, as consistency of law is one of the basic requirements of the rule of law. 22 Yet, consistency is not an end in itself. It is instead a means to ensure that the law will develop in a principled fashion so as to serve the ideal of the system. Thus, as Judge Tanaka of the International Court of Justice once noted:
23
[T] he requirement of the consistency ofjurisprudence is never absolute. It cannot be maintained at the sacrifice of the requirements of justice and reason. The Court should not hesitate to overrule the precedents and should not be preoccupied with the authority of its past decisions. The formal authority of the Court's decision must not be maintained to the detriment of its substantive authority. Therefore, it is quite inevitable that, from the point of view of the conclusion or reasoning, the minority in one case should become the majority in another case of the same kind within a comparatively short space of time.
19 According to DSU article 17.14, an Appellate Body report "shall be adopted" by the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and "unconditionally accepted by the parties to the dispute unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt the Appellate Body report." The negative consensus requirement ensures that an AB report will always be adopted in practice. 
